

Retrenchment and Revolt

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poverty of the East Ukraine and the predominance in many¹⁸⁶ nominally Ukrainian places of the Russian language and cul-⁶²⁶ture.⁷⁵ East Ukrainian students coming to L'vov, on the other hand, had their first opportunity to become infected with the "virus" of "bourgeois nationalism."⁷⁶ Aside from producing these^{668*} undesired ideological results, the earlier policy^{668*} failed to prevent underground work by the Nationalist youth of Galicia.

Most of the members of the OUN were not able, of course, to leave the Soviet-occupied area. It is impossible to secure reliable^[486] evidence concerning the exact extent to which those who re-^{668*}mained could carry on their activities, but it is certain that they⁶⁶¹ carefully refrained from open opposition. Nevertheless, late in 1940 the NKVD succeeded in tracking down a large number of Nationalists; they were sentenced to death or prison after a proceeding in L'vov known in the OUN accounts as the "trial of the fifty-nine." Among those sentenced to death was Krymins'kyi, the chief of the OUN movement in Soviet-occupied territories.⁷⁷ In all likelihood, he and his companions had sided with Bandera in the dispute with Mel'nyk. Certainly, the remaining members who, in spite of severe losses, were able to continue as an organized underground, were firm adherents of the new leader. The new underground director, John Klymiv, was in fact one of the most fanatical supporters which this fanatical movement of the younger generation could boast.⁷⁸ While there were undoubtedly many supporters of Colonel Mel'nyk in Galicia, it is doubtful whether they were active—or rash—enough to form what could be called an underground, although apparently agents kept up sporadic contacts with headquarters in the Generalgouvernement.

The situation in Volhynia was less favorable to Nationalist^{668*} activity than that in Galicia, since the OUN had never enrolled such a high proportion of the youth there. Throughout most if not all of the area, Mel'nyk and Bandera apparently had no

⁷⁵ *Krakivs'ki Visti*, September 17, 1943, p. 3.

⁷⁶ Interview 51.

⁷⁷ See, for example, Mykhailiuk, p. 4. Cf. *Ukrains'kyi Visnyk*, August 17, 1941, p. 4, reprinting an article from *Ukrains'ki Shchodenni Visti* (L'vov).

⁷⁸ Interview 48.

4 [Non-Interference with Ukrainian national aspirations -- Analyst]

731 the Moscow Government, in 1933, forbade foreign journalists to
656 enter Ukraine.

Back in the summer of 1932 the Ukrainian farmers in Canada addressed the Soviet Red Cross with the proposition to send their grain for gratis distribution among the hungry in Ukraine. But Moscow resolutely refused to accept this gift. The hunger catastrophe of 1932/33 was so great that the population of Ukraine died in masses, and cannibalism and necrophagy spread among the people. The peasants of Ukraine, weakened and decimated by the famine, were forced to enter 'voluntarily' the Soviet collective farms. Though the harvest of 1933 was good, millions of Ukrainians did not live to see it.

The dimensions of the devastations of Ukraine by the famine 'organised' by Soviet Russia were carefully concealed by the Russian Communist Government, and are even now kept secret. Only by chance some foreign correspondents learned about the results of this famine in Ukraine. W. H. Chamberlin writes in his book, *The Confessions of an Individualist*: New York, 1941, on the famine of 1933 as follows:

• [486] "There were many rumours of mass starvation, especially in the normally rich farming regions of Ukraine and the North Caucasus. The impression that something very abnormal was taking place in the villages was strengthened by the fact that the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs had introduced a new rule forbidding journalists to travel in Russia without special permission — a permission which was never granted when Ukraine and the North Caucasus were mentioned as destinations. The official explanation of this ruling would have deserved an international mendacity prize. It was that the presence of foreign correspondents would disturb the harvesting operations . . . The ban on journalistic travel was suggestively lifted after the new harvest had been gathered in — after there had been an opportunity to bury the corpses and to remove the outward signs of the famine —".

The same author writes about his visit to the Ukrainian part of the North Caucasus — the Kuban Region:

"This had been one of the richest and most smiling agricultural regions in Russia . . . There was an amazing lack of domestic animals; one saw none of the dogs that had formerly rushed out barking when we entered Cossack villages. In the first house we entered at random we found that seven members of the family have died of hunger. Three had survived. We did not meet any peasant who did not tell us of the loss of relatives or friends".

On the famine in Ukraine Chamberlin writes: